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Abstract 
We estimate the Piketty ratios in South Korea during the period of 1966-2013 using a 
consistent set of data on stocks of wealth. To the extent that South Korea’s capitalism in the 
modern sense took off only in the early 1960s, we are indeed covering the almost entire 
history of modern capitalism in South Korea. We find the following. 
First, although there were two big humps, one in the early 1970s and another in the 
early 1990s, the capital-income ratio ( b ) has been continuously increasing from 1966 to 
2013. The level of the capital-income ratio in South Korea is also high relative to other 
OECD countries. A part of the reasons for it is a high level of government wealth-income 
ratios in South Korea; the government in South Korea played an important role in capital  
accumulation. Another reason is that land prices in South Korea have been high relative to 
national income levels.    
Second, the capital income share (a ) has also been increasing over the last half 
century, and it moves largely in tandem with many inequality indices, such as the Gini 
coefficient, the top decile income share, and the Theil index on industrial wage inequality. 
This implies that worsening or improvement of income inequality in South Korea has been 
closely correlated with rising or declining share of capital income relative to labor income.  
Third, the rate of return on capital (r ) has been lower than the income growth rate 
until the mid-1990s; the former is bigger than the latter only after the mid-1990s. This 
phenomenon, due to unusually fast economic growth in South Korea, is sharply in contrast 
with those observed in other OECD countries, where the rate of return on capital has been 
much bigger than the income growth rate for a long period of time. Although g  has been 
bigger than r  in South Korea for a long period of time (30 years), however, the movement 
of a  appears to be highly and positively correlated with the movement of r g  as Piketty 
predicts; these two variables move largely in tandem. 
Fourth, the annual wealth growth rate in real terms during the entire period is 8.4%, 
which decomposes into 3.4% of the savings-induced wealth growth rate and 4.8% of the 
capital gains-induced wealth growth rate. Thus more than 50% of the wealth growth is due to 
capital gains in South Korea. In particular, the period of 1966-1979 exhibits the most 
significant capital gains-induced wealth growth; about 70% of the wealth growth is due to 
capital gains. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last half century, South Korea’s national income has grown spectacularly. 
In the early 1960s, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world; as of 2015, it is 
the eleventh largest economy in the world in terms of the size of gross domestic product. 
Poverty has been significantly reduced during the last half century, and benefits from high 
growth have been enjoyed by most of the population, at least up until 1998, although they may 
not have always been equally distributed.  
What about wealth in South Korea? How has wealth grown in South Korea over the 
past 50 years? Who own the wealth, how concentrated is it, and who enjoy the benefits from 
wealth accumulation? Have wage earners fared well relative to capital owners from the wealth 
accumulation? Has wealth accumulation been largely due to accumulation of savings or to 
capital gains? Did private savings come largely from individual hard work or from lucky gifts 
one receives? This paper addresses some of these questions using a newly constructed data set 
on stocks of wealth in South Korea.  
These questions have been difficult to answer until very recently in South Korea. 
Although the National Income and Product Account, reporting flows of income, consumption, 
investment, etc., have been well developed in South Korea, the National Balance Sheet 
reporting stocks of wealth have not been available until May, 2014. Facing the predicament, 
several authors have attempted to estimate stocks of wealth in South Korea (Kim and Hong, 
1997; Pyo, 1998, 2003). Their estimates are, however, largely restricted to produced non-
financial assets; most of non-produced non-financial assets (such as land and natural resources) 
are left unestimated, which turn out to take about 65% of the total non-financial assets in 2013 
in South Korea according to our new data set.  
Our present work is greatly inspired by a series of recent work by Piketty and his 
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collaborators (Piketty, 2014; Piketty and Saez, 2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2013, 2014, 2015), 
which indeed opened the door to a new science of economic inequality.   
In Piketty’s theory, there are at least two mechanisms by which capital is the main 
reason for rising wealth and income inequality. The first mechanism is that the wealthy are 
likely to accumulate more and more wealth, as a percentage of national income, because the 
return they get from existing wealth is higher than the growth rate of income. Consequently, 
the share of annual income that accrues to the owners of capital will increase, which in turn 
increases the incomes of the already-wealthy owners of capital relative to the much larger 
portion of the population who earn income mostly from their labor. The second mechanism is 
that even if capital income share remains constant, the wealth and income distributions can still 
become more and more skewed due to capital accumulation if the rate of return on capital 
earned by the wealthy is an increasing function of his/her initial wealth, or if the savings rate 
is an increasing function of initial wealth, or both. 
Both mechanisms are premised on the relationship that the rate of return to capital is 
higher than the income growth rate. Both mechanisms are also based on the empirically robust 
fact that the distribution of capital is highly skewed. Due to limitation on data, we cannot 
identity both mechanisms in South Korea; we only provide a partial answer to the first 
mechanism. 
Our paper is not the first estimating the Piketty ratios using South Korean data; there 
have already been several, all written in Korean. None has studied the evolution of the Piketty 
ratios over such a long period of time with a highly consistent set of data on wealth in South 
Korea. Some use consistent sets of data, but the covered periods are too short. Joo (2014), for 
instance, estimates the Piketty ratios using the Korean National Balance Sheet, but covers only 
the period of 2001-2012. Others cover longer periods, but mix different sets of data that are not 
necessarily consistent each other. Pyo (2015), for instance, studies the evolution of the Piketty 
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ratios for a very long period of time, even including the colonial period (1910-1945), but 
employs three different sets of data that are not consistent each other.1  
The current paper estimates the Piketty ratios in South Korea using a highly 
consistent set of data covering a sufficiently long period of time. Our data set fully exploits the 
estimates in the Korean National Balance Sheet (KNBS hereafter) for the period of 1995-2013. 
It then extends the data series to earlier years using Cho et al. (2014)’s estimates on land that 
are almost perfectly compatible with those in the Korean National Balance Sheet. Indeed, we 
find that estimates on land between 1995-2012 by Cho et al. (2014) match almost perfectly 
with those in the Korean National Balance Sheet during the same period. 2  Using some 
assumptions that are not so heroic, we are able to extend the coverage period down to 1966.  
Our coverage period might even be called the ‘entire history’ of modern capitalism 
in South Korea. Indeed a generally accepted view among historians is that South Korean 
capitalism really took off in the early 1960s, when General Park Chung-Hee and his junta have 
overthrown the Second Republic in 1961 by a military coup, and started modern 
industrialization right after it.  
Some economic historians might challenge this conventional view and argue that 
Korean capitalism started to take off in 1910, when Korea was annexed to Japan as a colony; 
they might say that true history of capitalism in Korea is incomplete without covering the 
colonial period. Pyo (2015)’s attempt at covering the colonial period seems to be a response to 
this argument. This is not a place for debating about when Korean capitalism truly began. We 
                                          
1 Pyo (2015)’s work was brought to our attention after the current manuscript is almost completed. We thank 
Young Sik Kim in Seoul National University for bringing Pyo’s work to our attention.  
2 This is perhaps not surprising. One of the authors in Cho et al. (2014), Taehyoung Cho, is indeed a member of 
the Bank of Korea Statistics Department, and has led the team estimating the national wealth for the Korean 
National Balance Sheet. For this reason, we do not believe that serious consistency problems arise from 
combining Cho et al. (2014)’s data on land with those in the KNBS. We would like to thank Taehyoung Cho for 
sharing his data on land with us. 
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just do not cover this period in our study for the following reasons. 
First, although there are some estimates for stocks of wealth during the colonial 
period, the quality of their estimates does not match with the quality of the estimates we use 
for our study period. It seems almost impossible to extend the data set into this period in a 
consistent manner while maintaining a high degree of data quality.    
Second, it is debatable whether a colony can sustain a capitalist economic system 
independently of its colonial mother county. Leaving quality issues aside, one can still debate 
whether their estimates are for stocks of capital in Korea, after netting out the influence of 
Japan. Much of capital in Korea at that time was owned by Japanese people. 
Third, after liberation, one Korea was divided into two Koreas in 1948, and the two 
Koreas entered into disastrous war during 1950-1953. Indeed economies in both the South and 
the North underwent a series of structural breaks during 1945-1953, and thus, in many respects, 
the economic history of the two Koreas after 1945 is no longer a simple extension of the 
economic history of one Korea during the colonial period. 
Our goals in this paper are twofold. First, we provide time series pictures on the 
evolution of the Piketty ratios in South Korea during the last half century, and infer some 
implications on the development of South Korean capitalism from them. Second, we 
systematically compare the Piketty ratios in South Korea with those estimated by Piketty and 
Zucman (2013, 2014) for other OECD countries, and locate South Korea’s place in the world 
capitalist economy. Table 1 shows the list of OECD countries that are compared in the current 
paper and the covered time period for each country. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows.  
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In section 2, we briefly review the essence of Piketty’s theoretical framework. Piketty’s 
theoretical framework is largely based upon the assumption that capital gains are either absent 
or negligible. Capital gains are not negligible in some countries, however. Following Piketty 
and Zucman (2013, 2014), section 2 thus introduces capital gains explicitly and reformulates 
Piketty’s second law of capitalism accordingly. This section also briefly discusses Piketty and 
Zucman (2014)’s two methods of decomposing wealth growth into subcomponents.  
In section 3, we estimate Piketty ratios using South Korean data, and compare the 
results with those for OECD countries reported in Piketty and Zucman (2013, 2014). Our main 
findings are the following. First, although there were two big humps, one in the early 1970s 
and another in the early 1990s, the capital-income ratio ( b ) has been continuously rising from 
1966 to 2013. The level of the capital-income ratio in South Korea is also very high relative to 
other OECD countries, due partly to a high level of government wealth-income ratios, and 
partly to high land prices relative to national income levels in South Korea. Second, the capital 
income share (a ) has also been increasing over the last half century, and it moves largely in 
tandem with many inequality indices, such as the Gini coefficient, the top decile income share, 
and the Theil index on industrial wage inequality. Third, although there are some fluctuations, 
the rate of return on capital, r , has been moving around at about the rate of 6%. It has been 
greater than the income growth rate since the late-1990s; before that, it has always been lower 
than the income growth rate. Also the movement of r g  follows the movement of a  very 
closely; when r g  increases/decreases, so does a . 
In section 4, we decompose the wealth growth in South Korea into three components: 
(1) the wealth growth due to initial wealth, (2) the wealth growth due to the accumulation of 
savings, and (3) the wealth growth due to capital gains. The annual wealth growth rate during 
the entire period is 8.4%, which decomposes into 3.4% of the savings-induced wealth growth 
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rate and 4.8% of the capital gains-induced wealth growth rate. Thus more than 50% of the 
wealth growth is due to capital gains. In particular, the period of 1966-1980 exhibits the most 
significant capital gains-induced wealth growth; about 70% of the wealth growth is due to 
capital gains. On the other hand, the period of 1980-1998 exhibits the least significant capital 
gains-induced wealth growth; about 48% of the wealth growth is due to capital gains.  
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Review of Piketty’s theoretical framework  
 
In his book, Capital in the 21st Century, Piketty describes two fundamental laws of 
capitalism. The first is an identity: ra b=  , where a  is the share of capital income in 
national income, r  is the rate of return on capital, and b  is the capital-income ratio. The 
second is an equilibrium statement, which holds only in the steady state: s gb =  , where s  
is the net savings rate and g  is the annual growth rate of national income. This section briefly 
discusses some theoretical and conceptual issues related with these laws. 
Piketty describes these laws while assuming that capital gains are either absent or 
negligible. The second law of capitalism, for instance, is derived from a law of motion dictating 
the growth of wealth from one period to another under the assumption that capital gains effects 
are zero. Capital gains effects are, however, non-negligible in the wealth accumulation of South 
Korea during the period we study. Because it is not difficult to reformulate the second law 
while taking the effect of capital gains on wealth accumulation into account, this paper, 
following Piketty and Zucman (2013, 2014), introduces capital gains explicitly, and use the 
second law reformulated accordingly. This section also briefly discusses Piketty and Zucman 
(2013, 2014)’s two methods of decomposing wealth growth into three components: (1) the 
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wealth growth due to initial wealth, (2) the wealth growth due to the accumulation of savings, 
and (3) the wealth growth due to capital gains. Piketty and Zucman (2013, 2014) call the two 
methods additive and multiplicative decomposition methods, respectively.     
Let us start with the following identity: 
1t t t t
W W S KG+ = + + ,3     (1) 
where 
t
W  and 
1t
W +  are the amounts of wealth at years t  and 1t + , respectively, tS  is 
the saving flow (net of depreciation) between years t  and 1t + , and 
t
KG  is the capital 
gains (capital losses if negative) between years t  and 1t + . All the variables in equation (1) 
are expressed in real terms. Equation (1) states that wealth at year 1t +  is the sum of wealth 
at year t , the net saving flow between the two years, and the capital gains between the years.  
Note that equation (1) is a pure accounting identity. By definition, it holds in any model, 
independently of the specific behavioral assumptions of economic agents. If the economy 
produces only one good, which works as both consumption and capital goods, there would be 
no capital gains; there are no relative price change. In that case, wealth accumulation would be 
driven only by saving flows. If the economy, however, consists of multiple sectors, some of 
which produce consumption goods and others of which produce capital goods, then capital 
gains would not be equal to zero.  
Cumulating wealth over n  years using equation (1), we have  
1 1
1 1
.
n n
t n t t j t j
j j
W W S KG
- -
+ + +
= =
= + +å å    (2) 
                                          
3 To be precise, the right hand side of equation (1) is 
t t t t
W S KG O+ + + , where 
t
O  is other changes in 
wealth due, say, to natural disaster, discovery of new natural resources etc. We attribute 
t
O  to 
t
S .  
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Dividing both sides of equation (2) by national income at year t n+ , 
t n
Y + , yields 
, , ,
ini sav kg
t n t t n t t n t t n
b b b b+ + + += + + ,    (3) 
where 
,
(1 )ini nt
t t n t
t n
W
g
Y
b b+
+
= = + , 
1
1
,
n
t j
jsav
t t n
t n
S
Y
b
-
+
=
+
+
=
å
, and 
1
1
,
n
t j
jkg
t t n
t n
KG
Y
b
-
+
=
+
+
=
å
.  
Equation (3) states that the growth of b  between years t   and t n+   is 
decomposed into three components: (1) the growth of wealth due to initial wealth, (2) the 
growth of wealth due to accumulation of savings, and (3) the growth of wealth due to capital 
gains. This is the equation for Piketty and Zucman (2014)’s method of decomposing wealth 
growth additively.  
Alternatively, one can rewrite equation (1) as 
1
(1 )( )
t t t t
W q W S+ = + + ,    (4) 
where t
t
t t
KG
q
W S
= +  is the capital gains-induced wealth growth rate. Dividing both sides of 
equation (4) by 
t
Y  yields 
1
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
t t t wst t
g q gb b+ + = + + ,    (5) 
from which it follows that  
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
wt t wst
g q g+ = + + ,    (6) 
where 11 t
t
t
Y
g
Y
++ = ,  11 t
wt
t
W
g
W
++ = , and 1 1 1t t
wst
t t
s S
g
Wb+ = + = +  .  
Equation (6) shows that in each period, the real wealth growth rate (
wt
g ) can be broken 
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down into saving-induced wealth growth rate (
wst
g ) and capital gains-induced wealth growth 
rate ( tq ).Were there no capital gains due to increased asset prices, the real wealth growth rate 
(
wt
g ) would be simply equal to the saving-induced wealth growth rate (
ws
g ).  
Cumulating over n years in equation (5), we get 
1
0
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
n nn
t j wst j ws
t n t tn
j t j
q g q g
g g
b b b
- + +
+
= +
+ + + += =+ + ,  (7) 
where 
1
0
(1 ) 1
n
n
t j
j
q q
-
+
=
= + - , 1
0
(1 ) 1
n
n
t j
j
g g
-
+
=
= + - , and 1
0
(1 ) 1
n
n
ws wst j
j
g g
-
+
=
= + - . 
Now 
t n
b +  can be decomposed as 
, , ,
ini sav kg
t n t t n t t n t t n
b b b b+ + + += + +  ,    (8) 
where 
, ,
(1 )sav ini ws
t t n t t n
ws
g
q g
b b+ += - +
  and 
, ,
(1 )kg ini
t t n t t n
ws
q
q g
b b+ += - +
 . This is the basic 
equation for Piketty and Zucman (2014)’s multiplicative decomposition method. 
How is the second law modified when capital gains effects are taken into account? 
Assume 
t
g g= , 
t
q q= , and 
t
s s= . Then equation (5) becomes 
1
(1 )
( )
(1 )t t
q
s
g
b b+
+= ++ ,    (9) 
and thus 
* (1 )
t q
s q
g q
b b + = - .    (10) 
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Equation (10) is the modified second law when capital gains effects are present. If 0q = , 
then * (1 )
q
s q
g q
b += -  reduces to 
s
g
. 
 
3. Piketty ratios in South Korea: 1966-2013 
 
3.1   Capital-income ratio (b ) 
 
The capital-income ratio is probably the most important variable in this paper. The 
denominator of this variable, national income, is relatively straightforward to define and easy 
to calculate. Estimating the numerator of this variable (capital) is much more complicated.  
Piketty’s national income is equivalent to the net national income in the system of 
national accounts, which is obtained from gross national income after subtracting consumption 
of fixed capital (i.e., depreciation of capital). We obtained the data on national income for the 
entire period from the Korean National Income and Product Accounts (KNIPA). 
Table 2 calculates the real income growth rate, the population growth rate, and the 
savings rate of South Korea during the period, and compare them with the corresponding 
figures in other OECD countries. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
During the past 50 years, South Korea’s national income grew at the rate of 7.26% per 
annum in real terms. Population grew at the annual rate of 1.15%, which results in the 6.11% 
annual growth rate of real per capita income. Compared with other OECD countries, the real 
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income growth rate is indeed spectacular.  
In Table 2, we break the entire period into three subperidods: 1966-1979, 1980-1997, 
and 1998-2013. The first period (1966-1979) might correspond to what Rostow (1960) calls 
the takeoff stage of South Korean capitalism. Export-oriented industrialization began in the 
early 1960s and very high income growth was sustained during this period. During the period, 
the real growth rate of national income was 9.37% per annum, and per capita real income grew 
at the rate of 7.49% per annum. The first period ends by Park Chung-Hee’s being assassinated. 
The second period (1980-1997), which begins with the establishment of a new, short-lived, 
dictatorship and ends with the outbreak of the East Asian financial crisis, might correspond to 
what Rostow (1960) calls the stage of drive to maturity. During this period, industrial bases 
were diversified; multiple industries beyond textile ones, such as automobiles, ship building 
and electronics, expanded quickly and took root in the economy. At the same time, shifts from 
investment-driven capital goods towards consumer durables and domestic consumption have 
also started. High growth continued during this period; the real national income grew at the 
rate of 8.68% per annum, and real per capita income grew at the rate of 7.58% per annum. 
Inequality, which had been rising in the first period, has been gradually declining during this 
period. Political democracy has also been won in this period. The third period marks a new 
phase in South Korean capitalism. The outbreak of the East Asian financial crisis stopped South 
Korea’s drive to maturity and South Korean capitalism entered into a phase with declining 
growth and rising inequality. During the period of 1998-2013, the real growth rate of national 
income in South Korea was only about 4%, and per capita income growth rate is about 3.41%. 
Certainly these figures are still high compared with other OECD countries, but constitute only 
less than half of the corresponding figures in the previous two subperiods. 
In Table 2, we report not only income growth rates but also the annual private savings 
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rate.4 The private savings rate is also high; it is almost 14%. Although the private savings rate 
has always been high during the entire period, it is particularly high (20.5%) during 1980-1997; 
afterwards the savings rate of South Korea approaches the savings rates of other OECD 
countries and moves in tandem with them. Figure 1 compares the private savings rate of South 
Korea with those in other OECD countries over the entire period. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In Piketty’s theory, b  is determined by s  and g  in the long run. Based upon the 
data from more than hundred years, Piketty and Zucman (2013) argue that the long run savings 
rate is stable in many OECD countries. This may not be true in the short-run, however. Because 
we cover only about 50 years, we cannot make judgment about what would transpire for the 
South Korean savings rate in the long run.  
Not only has the private savings rate been high in South Korea; the government savings 
rate has also been high. In Table 3, we calculate the private savings rate, the government 
savings rate, and the national savings rate. During the period of 1970-2012, the net government 
savings rates in other OECD countries have been either zero or negative. In contrast, the net 
savings rate of South Korean government has been almost 8% during the period 1966-2013 
and 8.3% during 1970-2010.  
 
                                          
4 Note that the savings rate in current paper is different from that reported in the National Income and Product 
Accounts. In the current paper, it is defined as the ratio of the amount of saving flow (net of depreciation) to the 
amount of national income (again, net of depreciation). The savings rate reported in the National Income and 
Product Accounts is defined as the ratio of the amount of gross savings flow to gross national disposable 
income, which is obtained from gross national income after adding the amount of net foreign current transfer. 
Both the numerator and the denominator in the savings rate reported in the National Income and Product 
Accounts include the amount of capital consumption.  
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
We now move on to the estimation of capital. In most economic theories, capital usually 
consists of produced assets, such as machinery and equipment. In Piketty’s work, however, it 
includes not only produced assets but also non-produced assets (such as land and subsoil assets) 
and financial assets (net of liabilities). Piketty’s notion of capital is thus much broader than 
those in standard economic theories, and is closer to the net worth (wealth) in the national 
balance sheet system. In this paper, we use capital and wealth interchangeably. The list of assets 
estimated by the Korean National Balance Sheet and that used in our definition of wealth, 
together with the estimation methods, are shown in Table A.1 in Appendix.  
The official Korean National Balance Sheet, first released on May, 2014, does not 
provide the data on national wealth for the entire period of 1966-2013. Estimates of produced 
non-financial assets are given in the KNBS for the period of 1970-2013, but estimates of non-
produced non-financial assets (largely land) are available only for the period of 1995-2013. 
Including only land for non-produced non-financial assets between 1995-2013 and using 
estimates on land for the previous years by Cho et al. (2014), we extend the series on non-
produced non-financial assets down to 1970 in a consistent way. Although we include only 
land for the non-produced non-financial assets, we do not think we systematically 
underestimate the non-produced non-financial assets. Indeed, land is by far the most important 
component of the non-produced non-financial assets in South Korea. According to the KNBS, 
for instance, land takes about 99% of the entire non-produced non-financial assets during the 
period of 1995-2013. We are assuming that the portion of other non-land assets in the non-
produced non-financial assets are minuscule during 1965-1994 as well.  
Between 1965-1969, we relied upon the following method.  
[more on this] 
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All the values reported in the KNBS are computed at the end of each year, whereas 
those in Piketty and Zucman (2014) are two year averages; for the sake of international 
comparison, we thus take two year averages.  
Depending upon how we treat the net wealth of corporations, we can create two 
different measures of national wealth. The first measure, which Piketty and Zucman (2014) 
call the ‘market value national wealth,’ simply defines national wealth as the sum of the net 
wealth of households and government, where net wealth of each institutional unit is the sum of 
non-financial assets and financial assets (net of liabilities) for that unit. In this measure, the 
capital stock of corporations is counted in national wealth through the equity holdings of 
households and government. The second measure, which Piketty and Zucman (2014) call the 
‘book value national wealth,’ defines national wealth as the sum of the market value national 
wealth and the net wealth of corporations. We call the market value national wealth simply by 
‘national wealth,’ and the book value national wealth by ‘national wealth B.’ Private wealth is 
equal to net national wealth minus net government wealth. We thus have three measures of 
wealth:   
 
National wealth = net wealth of households and government 
National wealth B = national wealth + net wealth of corporations 
Private wealth = net wealth of households. 
 
The two measures of national wealth coincide when the net wealth of corporations is 
equal to zero (or equivalently, when Tobin’s Q is equal to 1). Piketty and Zucman (2014) argue 
that net corporate wealth is close to zero in many Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the US, the 
UK, Canada, and Australia, but is very different from zero in other countries, such as Japan, 
Germany, and France. We find that net corporate wealth in South Korea cannot be considered 
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to be zero.  
Figure 2 shows capital-income ratio in South Korea during the period of 1965-2013, 
where wealth is measured in three different ways. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Levels of the three measures of wealth are different, but all of them show similar pattern 
over time. Although there are two big humps, one in the early 1970s and the other in the early 
1990s, all of the three series have been continuously rising from 1966 to 2013. The national 
capital-income ratio has risen from 400% in 1966 to 800% in 2013, while the book-value 
national capital-income ratio has risen from 479% in 1966 to 954% in 2013. Finally, the private 
capital-income ratio has risen from 332% in 1966 to 543% in 2013. Although the general 
pattern is a continuous rise of capital-income ratios over the entire period, however, different 
subperiods exhibit different patterns in the evolution of the capital-income ratio.  
To understand the main force behind the gradual rise of the capital-income ratio, we 
decompose the national and private wealth into several sub-categories: housing, agricultural 
land, other domestic capital, and net foreign capital. Other domestic capital is also broken down 
into three subcategories: net domestic financial capital, other domestic non-financial capital, 
and social overhead capital. Other domestic non-financial capital includes non-residential 
buildings and underlying land, facilities assets, intellectual property products, and inventories. 
Social overhead capital includes structures and underlying land, recreational land, and other 
land. Housing capital includes dwellings and underlying land. Agricultural land includes 
agricultural land and forest land. (See Table A.1 in Appendix for asset classification.) Figure 3 
shows the composition of the national wealth.  
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[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Among various categories of national capital, net foreign capital takes a relatively small 
(mostly negative) share and its trend is quite stable; it takes -0.8% of national wealth in 2013. 
See also Table 4. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Among categories of domestic capital, the share of net domestic financial capital has 
been increasing over time, but it still takes a relatively small portion (19.9%) in 2013. The share 
of other domestic non-financial capital is also not large, and its share has been stable over time. 
Housing and agricultural land, on the other hand, take a lion’s share; they take 46.1% of the 
entire national wealth in 2013.5 Also the movement of the ratio of housing and agricultural 
land over income largely determines the movement of capital-income ratio; when the former’s 
time series shows humps, so does the latter’s. Indeed the two big humps in the time series 
picture of b  corresponds to two housing and land price bubble in South Korea.6 It is clear 
that housing and agricultural land play a major role in the movement of the capital-income ratio 
in South Korea, regardless of how we measure wealth. Table 5 shows decomposition of 
domestic capital accumulation into housing capital accumulation and other domestic capital 
accumulation. 
                                          
5 In classifying national wealth into various forms, we classify a part of land into other domestic capital. For 
instance, land underlying non-residential buildings is classified into other domestic non-financial capital. Land 
underlying structures, recreational land, and other land are classified into social overhead capital.    
6 There were several housing and land price bubbles in South Korea. They occurred during 1965-69, 1975-
1979, 1988-1991, and 2003-2009. 
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[Table 5 about here] 
  
Figure 4 shows the decomposition of wealth by households (including non-profit 
institutions serving households), corporations, and government.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Compared to other countries, is the capital-income ratio in South Korea high? In 
Figures 5 and 6 below, we compare the capital-income ratio of South Korea to those of other 
OECD countries. Figure 5 shows the ratios obtained from national wealth, while Figure 6 
shows those obtained from private and government wealth separately.  
Figure 5 shows that when estimated with market value national wealth, Japan and Korea 
have very high levels of the capital-income ratio relative to other OECD countries, although 
Spain has the highest level after 2004. It is interesting to observe that South Korea and Japan 
follow an almost identical path up until the early 1990s, reflecting the land price bubble in both 
countries. Japan’s bubble has burst out after 1990, whereas South Korea’s has not yet.  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Why has national capital-income ratio been so high in South Korea and Japan? It is 
partly because government wealth has been large in both countries. Figure 6 illustrates this 
point, where we plot private capital-income and government capital-income ratios separately. 
 
 [Figure 6 about here] 
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Recall that national wealth consists of private and government wealth. In contrast with 
the national capital-income ratios, the levels of the private capital-income ratios in South Korea 
and Japan have not been exceptionally high relative to those of other OECD countries, which 
implies that the main source of the difference in national capital-income ratios between these 
countries lies in government wealth. In most countries in our sample, the government capital-
income ratios have been declined, reaching at almost zero percent of national income in 2010; 
in some countries, such as Italy, the government capital-income ratio is even negative. In South 
Korea, on the other hand, the government capital-income ratio has risen steadily, from 71% in 
1966 to 264% in 2013.  
There are several reasons for why government capital-income ratio in South Korea is 
high compared to other countries.  
First, over the last 50 years South Korean government has taken an important role in 
capital accumulation and economic development. It owns much of social overhead capital and 
other domestic non-financial capital. 
Second, since the 1980s, many OECD countries have accumulated a large amount of 
public debt, and have sold much of government assets, including public enterprises. South 
Korea, on the other hand, does not have much public debt yet, and privatization has not gone 
too far.   
Third, South Korean public pensions, which started in 1988, are based upon a funded 
system and therefore pension funds in South Korea are counted as government assets. They 
grew very fast recently. In contrast, many OECD countries adopt pay-as-you-go system of 
public pensions, and these pensions are not recorded as government assets. (See Piketty and 
Zucman (2013), p.21 of Appendix.) If we adjust for this difference, then government capital-
income ratio in South Korea would be a little bit reduced 
19 
 
That government capital-income ratio is high is only a part of the story for a high 
capital-income ratio in South Korea. Another one, which is perhaps more important, is that 
land prices in South Korea have been too high relative to national income levels.  
[more on this]   
 
3.2   Capital income share (a ) 
 
We have seen that capital-income ratio has been rising steadily since 1966. Who have 
benefited from such dramatic capital accumulation in South Korea? Have wage earners fared 
well vis-à-vis capital owners?  
Rising capital-income ratio may not be a problem in itself from a distributional 
perspective. From a purely technical point of view, it only means that capital intensity has been 
increasing in production processes. To address these question, we need to look at the split of 
national income into labor and capital income and their evolution over time. 
Recall that Piketty’s national income is the net national income, which includes net 
production and import taxes (subtracting subsidies). Taxes go neither to workers nor to capital 
owners. Thus we will focus on the split of national income net of taxes into labor and capital 
income.  
In estimating capital income, one tricky issue arises in the treatment of incomes of the 
self-employed. This is a group of producers that Marxists call the ‘petty bourgeoisie.’ They 
own some properties but also provide labor services. In many OECD countries, the share of 
the incomes of the self-employed is small, and thus how to treat their incomes does not affect 
the overall trend of capital income shares significantly. But in the countries where the share of 
the income of the self-employed is not small, like in South Korea, the overall trend of the 
capital income share may change drastically depending on how we treat income of the self-
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employed.  
There are at least two popular methods for treating the incomes of the self-employed. 
The first method attributes the entire income of the self-employed to capital income. The Bank 
of Korea, for instance, uses this method when reporting the capital income share. This method 
is simple but clearly overestimates capital income. The second method, on the other hand, 
attributes only a part of the self-employed income to capital income. It is based on the idea that 
a self-employed person is both a laborer and a property owner, so that his/her income should 
be broken down into labor and capital income properly. Piketty and Zucman (2014) and Joo 
and Jeon (2014), for instance, take this method. We also follow the second method.  
Figure 7 shows how the two methods yield entirely different time series. The capital 
income share in South Korea estimated with the first method clearly exhibits a higher level 
than that estimated with the second method. The difference between the two estimates lies not 
only in the levels; the trends also differ. Capital income share estimated with the first method 
has been declined, from 66% in 1966 to 37% in 2013. When estimated with the second method, 
however, the capital income share in South Korea has been rising during 1966-1979, slightly 
declining during 1980-1997, and rising again after 1998. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
To understand why the two methods yield different time series of the capital income 
share, we decompose factor income shares into several sub-categories in Figure 8.  
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
Note that both non-self-employed labor and capital income shares have been increasing, 
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whereas the income share of the self-employed has been decreasing. The income share of the 
self-employed in South Korea is nearly 55% of national income in 1966 but only 12% as of 
2013. Adding the entire income share of the self-employed into the non-self-employed capital 
income share would result in a declining capital income share, while adding the entire income 
share of the self-employed into the non-self-employed labor income share would result in an 
increasing capital income share. This explains why different methods would yield very 
different time series of the capital income share.  
In applying the second method, we attribute not the entire income share of the self-
employed but only a part of it to the labor income share. Thus the speed at which the labor and 
capital income share of the self-employed declines is important for determining the overall 
trend of the capital income share. It turns out that the speed at which the labor income share of 
the self-employed is decreased is much faster than the speed at which the capital income of the 
self-employed is decreased.  
Figure 7 also compares our estimates on capital-income share with Cho et al. (2014)’s 
estimates. Cho et al. (2014) also assume that the self-employed income can be divided into 
labor and capital income, but unlike us, maintain that per capita wage of the self-employed is 
equal to half of the per capita income of laborers in other sectors. Nevertheless, these two 
estimates move very closely each other, and show very different movements from that obtained 
from the first method. 
In Figure 9, we compare the capital income share with three inequality indices; they are 
the Gini coefficient estimated by Sung (2014), the top decile income share estimated by Kim 
and Kim (2014), and the Theil index on industrial wage inequality compiled by the University 
of Texas Inequality Project. All four move in tandem. This means that worsening or 
improvement of income inequality is closely correlated with rising or declining share of capital 
income relative to labor income.  
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[Figure 9 about here] 
 
Is capital income share in South Korea high relative to other OECD countries? To 
address this question, we juxtapose the graph of capital income share of South Korea to those 
of other OECD countries in Figure 10. Although there are some variations over time and across 
countries, the capital income share has been rising over time in almost all countries. The South 
Korean capital income share has been one of the highest during 1975-1980, but retreats into 
one of the middle range groups during 1980-2009. Recently, however, it came back to one of 
the highest.    
 
[Figure 10 about here] 
 
3.3   The rate of return on private capital (r ) 
 
The rate of return on capital, r , is computed by dividing the capital income share, a ,  
by the capital-income ratio, b . Because of the identity, ra b= , we have only two degrees 
of freedom. Conventionally, in the System of National Accounts, the net return on government 
wealth is assumed to be zero; we thus compute the rate of return on capital while taking only 
private wealth into account.  
Figure 11 shows the estimated values of the rate of return on capital in South Korea 
during 1966-2013, together with the plot of the income growth rate (Hodrick-Prescott filtered). 
 
[Figure 11 about here] 
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Piketty (2014) argues that persistence of r g>  is a major force for generating long-
run wealth inequality. In South Korea, the income growth rate has always been larger than the 
rate of return on capital, at least until the late 1990s; it is only after that the rate of return on 
capital has been larger than the income growth rate.  
This phenomenon is sharply in contrast with those observed in other OECD countries, 
where the income growth rate has been much smaller than the rate of return on capital for a 
long period of time; see Figure 12.  
 
[Figure 12 about here] 
 
Although g  has been bigger than r  in South Korea for a long period of time (30 
years), the movement of a  appears to be highly positively correlated with the movement of 
r g . As Figure 13 shows, these two variables move in tandem quite closely. 
 
[Figure 13 about here] 
 
As Piketty (2014) argues, high capital intensity, as measured by b , is not bad in itself. 
Piketty worries about a high ratio of b , because it usually implies very high concentration of 
capital among a handful of people. In linking a high ratio of b  to a high level of wealth 
inequality, Piketty focuses on inequality r g> . In Piketty’s model of wealth inequality, wealth 
inequality is an increasing function of the gap between these two variables. Piketty (2014) and 
Piketty and Saez (2014) argue that were savings rates stable over time, the inequality r g>  
would be the fundamental condition for persistent wealth inequality.  
The gap between r  and g  itself may not be important for explaining income 
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inequality. Consider, for instance, the following equation, which is obtained by combining 
Piketty’s first and second laws: r s
g
a = ´ . Even if we have r g> , capital income share may 
not increase if r g  remains constant over time. What appears to be more important to capital 
income share, and thus to income inequality, is the movement of r g  rather than the level of 
r g .  
One cannot say that the rate of return on capital in South Korea is unusually high 
relative to other OECD countries. Figures 14 compares the rate of return on capital across 
countries.  
  
[Figure 14 about here] 
 
Although the rate of return on capital in South Korea moves around at the rate of 6%, 
there are clearly fluctuations, and the movement of r  is strongly negatively correlated the 
movement of b . Whenever b  increases/decreases, r  falls/rises. At the same time, the 
movement of a  is weakly positively correlated with the movement of b . See Figures 15-17. 
 
[Figures 15-17 about here] 
 
That b  and r  are negatively correlated is not surprising; as capital becomes more 
abundant, it becomes cheaper. A more interesting point is that a  is positively correlated with 
b . It means that as b  rises/falls, the speed at which r  falls/rises is smaller than the speed 
at which b  rises/falls. The positive relationship between a  and b  is, however, not strong. 
 
25 
 
4. Decomposition of wealth accumulation in South Korea 
 
In section 3, we have seen that thanks to high savings rate, produced non-financial 
assets, such as fixed assets and inventories, grew very fast over the last fifty years in South 
Korea. At the same time, we also have seen that housing and agricultural land play a major role 
in the movement of the overall capital-income ratio in South Korea, regardless of how we 
measure wealth. Between savings and capital gains associated with housing and land, which 
one plays a more important role in the capital accumulation of South Korea? This section 
addresses this question by employing the two decomposition methods we reviewed in section 
2.  
We first simulate the counterfactual capital-income ratio that could transpire in the 
environment without capital gains. The counterfactual wealth is obtained simply by adding 
saving flows to the previous year’s wealth. Figure 18 show the results. 
  
[Figure 18 about here] 
 
The simulated counterfactual capital-income ratio moderately declines up to the mid 1980s; it 
rises afterwards. Also compared with the actual capital-income ratio, the counterfactual capital-
income ratio reveal no humps in the early 1970s and the early 1990s. This implies that much 
of capital accumulation in South Korea, including booms and busts, are due to capital gains.  
Table 6 presents our results on the decomposition of private wealth accumulation in 
South Korea for the entire period as well as for three different subperiods.   
 
[Table 6 about here] 
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In contrast with other OECD countries, savings do not explain the largest part of 
private wealth accumulation in South Korea. Rather there usually have been much larger 
positive capital gains effects. Take the period of 1966-1980 as an example. Private wealth 
was equal to 332% of national income in 1966, and is equal to 543% of national income in 
2013. Private wealth has grown at the rate of 8.4% per annum. On the basis of saving flows 
alone, we find that wealth would have grown at the annual rate of 3.4% only. The remaining 
growth rate of 4.8% is capital-gains induced. Thus, when we use the multiplicative 
decomposition method, new savings explain 42% while capital gains explain 58% of the 
accumulation of private wealth in South Korea between 1966 and 2013. 
The decomposition methods we employ have one weakness; the results critically 
depend on the starting and ending years chosen. We thus applied the decomposition methods 
to three subperiods as well, to see whether the large share of capital-gains induced wealth 
growth is an artifact of the choice of the study period. As Table 6 shows, the results differ 
across different subperiods, but the fact that capital gains-induced growth takes a very large 
share in the accumulation of private wealth in South Korea remains true.   
Table 7 shows the similar results when national wealth accumulation is decomposed 
into savings-induced wealth accumulation and capital-gains-induced wealth accumulation. 
Numbers are different, but the patterns are largely similar to those found in Table 6. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
   
There is a simple way to decompose wealth accumulation using graphs. Let’s take the 
period of 1997-2013 and see the graphs appeared in Figure 19. 
 
[Figure 19 about here] 
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In Figure 19, we have drawn actual and counterfactual capital-income ratios for both 
national and private wealth. We also marked the level of counterfactual capital-income ratio 
that could be obtained with the accumulation of initial wealth alone. The difference between 
the actual level of b  at 2013 and this mark represents the size of the wealth accumulation that 
could be obtained from both savings and capital gains. The difference between the 
counterfactual level of b  at 2013 and this mark, on the other hand, represents the size of the 
wealth accumulation that could be obtained from savings alone.      
To assess how large the capital gains-induced wealth growth is, we redo the 
decomposition for the period of 1970-2010, and compare the results with those for other OECD 
countries reported in Piketty and Zucman (2013, 2014). Tables 8 and 9 report the results when 
the multiplicative decomposition method is applied.  
 
[Tables 8 and 9 about here] 
   
As is clear from Tables 8 and 9, savings play a more important role than capital gains 
in most of OECD countries. The only exception is the United Kingdom, where the share of 
capital gains-induced wealth growth is 45% for private wealth and 58% for national wealth. 
South Korean case appears to be much closer to the U.K. case; the share of capital gains-
induced wealth growth is 50% for private wealth and 48% for national wealth in South Korea.  
How do we explain the substantial capital gains we find in South Korea? Piketty and 
Zucman (2013, 2014) argue that housing and stock market capital gains may be important for 
the countries with the largest capital gains effects, such as the U.K. and France, and Italy. Also 
these countries have by far the largest level of housing wealth in the sample as well. So they 
conjecture that part of the capital gains they measure owe to abnormally high real estate prices 
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in these countries. This explanation appears to hold only partially in South Korea as well.  
[more on this later]    
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5   Concluding remark 
 
In this paper, we estimate the Piketty ratios in South Korea during the period of 1966-
2013 using a newly constructed, highly consistent set of data on stocks of wealth. The period 
we cover is long enough to be called the almost entire history of modern capitalism in South 
Korea.  
Our findings are summarized as follows.  
First, although there were two big humps, one around the early 1970s and another 
around the early 1990s, the capital-income ratio has been continuously rising during the last 
50 years. The level of the capital-income ratio in South Korea is also high relative to other 
OECD countries. A part of the reasons for it is a high level of government wealth-income 
ratios in South Korea. Another reason, which is perhaps more important, is that land prices in 
South Korea have been high relative to national income levels.    
Second, the capital income share has also been increasing over the last half century, and 
it moves largely in tandem with many inequality indices, such as the Gini coefficient, the top 
decile income share, and the Theil index on industrial wage inequality. This implies that 
worsening or improvement of income inequality in South Korea has been closely correlated 
with rising or declining share of capital income relative to labor income.  
Third, the rate of return on capital has been greater than the income growth rate only 
after the mid-1990s; before that, it has always been lower than the income growth rate. This 
phenomenon, due to unusually fast economic growth in South Korea, is sharply in contrast 
with those observed in other OECD countries, where the income growth rate has been much 
smaller than the rate of return on capital for a long period of time. Although r  has been 
smaller than g  in South Korea for a long period of time (30 years), however, the movement 
of a  appears to be highly and positively correlated with the movement of r g  ; these two 
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variables move largely in tandem. 
Fourth, the annual private wealth growth rate during the entire period is 8.4%, which 
decomposes into 3.4% of the savings-induced wealth growth rate and 4.8% of the capital gains-
induced wealth growth rate. Thus more than 50% of the wealth growth is due to capital gains 
in South Korea. In particular, the period of 1966-1980 exhibits the most significant capital 
gains-induced wealth growth; about 70% of the wealth growth is due to capital gains.  
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 Covered countries and period of the data set on income and wealth  
 Total period covered Annual series 
South Korea 1966-2013 1966-2013 
Japan 1960-2010 1960-2010 
USA 1770-2010 1869-2010 
UK 1700-2010 1855-2010 
France 1700-2010 1896-2010 
Germany 1870-2011 1870-2011 
Italy 1965-2011 1965-2011 
Spain 1987-2010 1987-2010 
 
 
Note: In addition to the above mentioned countries, Piketty and Zucman (2014) also 
include Australia and Canada in their analysis. Those who are interested in the 
comparison of the South Korean case with the two countries should look at 
Piketty and Zucman (2014).   
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 Income growth, population growth, and private savings rate: 
international comparison 
 
Real growth rate 
of national 
income 
Population 
growth rate 
Real growth rate 
of per capita 
national income 
Net private 
savings rate 
(personal + 
corporate) 
(% national income) 
South Korea     
1966-2013 7.26% 1.15% 6.11% 13.9% 
1966-1980 9.37% 1.87% 7.49% 13.4% 
1980-1997 8.68% 1.10% 7.58% 20.5% 
1997-2013 3.97% 0.56% 3.41% 11.3% 
1970-2010 7.18% 1.07% 6.11% 14.2% 
Japan 
1970-2010 2.5% 0.5% 2.0% 14.6% 
USA 
1970-2010 2.8% 1.0% 1.8% 7.7% 
UK 
1970-2010 2.2% 0.3% 1.9% 7.3% 
France 
1970-2010 2.2% 0.6% 1.6% 11.1% 
Germany 
1970-2010 2.0% 0.2% 1.8% 12.2% 
Italy 
1970-2010 1.9% 0.3% 1.6% 15.0% 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for 
other OECD countries.  
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 National and private savings rates, 1970-2010 : international 
comparison 
 
Net national 
savings rates 
(private + 
government) 
Net private 
savings rates 
(personal + 
corporate) 
  
Net 
government 
savings 
rates 
incl. 
personal 
savings 
incl. 
corporate 
savings 
(retained 
earnings) 
South Korea      
1966-2013 21.8% 13.9% 7.8% 6.1% 7.9% 56% 44% 
1966-1980 17.8% 13.4% 8.6% 4.7% 4.4% 64% 36% 
1980-1997 28.0% 20.5% 15.1% 5.4% 7.6% 74% 26% 
1997-2013 19.7% 11.3% 4.7% 6.6% 8.4% 42% 58% 
1970-2010 22.4% 14.2% 8.8% 5.4% 8.3% 62% 38% 
Japan 
1970-2010 14.6% 14.6% 
6.8% 7.8% 0.0% 47% 53% 
USA 
1970-2010 5.2% 7.7% 
4.6% 3.1% -2.4% 60% 40% 
UK 
1970-2010 5.3% 7.3% 
2.8% 4.6% -2.0% 38% 62% 
France 
1970-2010 9.2% 11.1% 
9.0% 2.1% -1.9% 81% 19% 
Germany 
1970-2010 10.2% 12.2% 
9.4% 2.9% -2.1% 76% 24% 
Italy 
1970-2010 8.5% 15.0% 
14.6% 0.4% -6.5% 97% 3% 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for 
other OECD countries.  
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 National wealth accumulation (domestic capital versus foreign 
capital), 1970-2010: international comparison 
 
National wealth-income 
ratio (1970) 
National wealth-income 
ratio (2010) 
1970-2010 rise in 
national wealth-income 
ratio 
Incl. 
domestic 
capital 
Incl. 
foreign 
capital 
Incl. 
domestic 
capital 
Incl. 
foreign 
capital 
Incl. 
domestic 
capital 
Incl. 
foreign 
capital 
South 
Korea 
594% 751% 158% 
615% -21% 765% -13% 150% 8% 
Japan 359% 616% 256% 356% 3% 548% 67% 192% 64% 
USA 404% 431% 27% 399% 4% 456% -25% 57% -30% 
UK 365% 527% 163% 359% 6% 548% -20% 189% -26% 
France 351% 605% 254% 340% 11% 618% -13% 278% -24% 
Germany 313% 416% 102% 305% 8% 377% 39% 71% 31% 
Italy 259% 609% 350% 247% 12% 640% -31% 392% -42% 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for 
other OECD countries. 
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 Domestic capital accumulation (housing versus all other domestic 
capital), 1970-2010: international comparison 
 
Domestic capital-
income ratio (1970) 
Domestic capital-
income ratio (2010) 
1970-2010 rise in 
domestic capital-income 
ratio 
Incl. 
housing 
Incl. other 
domestic 
capital 
Incl. 
housing 
Incl. other 
domestic 
capital 
Incl. 
housing 
Incl. other 
domestic 
capital 
South 
Korea 
615% 765% 150% 
232% 383% 245% 520% 14% 136% 
Japan 356% 548% 192% 131% 225% 220% 328% 89% 103% 
USA 399% 456% 57% 142% 257% 182% 274% 41% 17% 
UK 359% 548% 189% 98% 261% 300% 248% 202% -13% 
France 340% 618% 278% 104% 236% 371% 247% 267% 11% 
Germany 305% 377% 71% 129% 177% 241% 136% 112% -41% 
Italy 247% 640% 392% 107% 141% 386% 254% 279% 113% 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for 
other OECD countries. 
 
Note: Housing capital includes housing and underlying land. Other domestic capital 
includes all other domestic capital than the housing capital. (See Table A.1 in Appendix 
for asset classification.) 
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 Decomposition of private wealth growth in South Korea, 1966-2013 
 
Wealth-income ratio Income 
growth 
rate 
(g ) 
Decomposition of wealth growth rate Share of total wealth accumulation coming from 
t
b  
t n
b +  
Real growth 
rate of wealth 
(
w
g ) 
Savings-induced 
wealth growth 
rate (
ws
g ) 
Capital gains-
induced wealth 
growth rate (q )
Initial 
wealth savings 
Capital 
gains 
1966-2013 332% 543% 7.3% 8.4% 3.4% 4.8% 
Multiplicative 
2% 41% 57% 
 42% 58% 
Additive 
2% 46% 52% 
 47% 53% 
1966-1980 332% 380% 9.4% 10.4% 3.0% 7.2% 
Multiplicative 
25% 22% 53% 
 30% 70% 
Additive 
25% 29% 46% 
 39% 61% 
1980-1997 380% 420% 8.7% 9.3% 4.7% 4.4% 
Multiplicative 
22% 40% 38% 
 52% 48% 
Additive 
22% 45% 33% 
 57% 43% 
1997-2013 420% 543% 4.0% 5.6% 2.4% 3.1% 
Multiplicative 
42% 26% 33% 
 44% 56% 
Additive 
42% 25% 34% 
 42% 58% 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for other OECD countries. 
7 
 
 Decomposition of national wealth growth in South Korea, 1966-2013 
 
Wealth-income ratio Income 
growth 
rate 
(g ) 
Decomposition of wealth growth rate Share of total wealth accumulation coming from 
t
b  
t n
b +  
Real growth 
rate of wealth 
(
w
g ) 
Savings-induced 
wealth growth 
rate (
ws
g ) 
Capital gains-
induced wealth 
growth rate (q )
Initial 
wealth savings 
Capital 
gains 
1966-2013 400% 800% 7.3% 8.9% 3.8% 4.9% 
Multiplicative 
2% 43% 55% 
 44% 56% 
Additive 
2% 49% 49% 
 50% 50% 
1966-1980 400% 472% 9.4% 10.7% 3.4% 7.0% 
Multiplicative 
24% 25% 51% 
 32% 68% 
Additive 
24% 31% 44% 
 41% 59% 
1980-1997 472% 584% 8.7% 10.0% 4.9% 5.0% 
Multiplicative 
20% 40% 41% 
 50% 50% 
Additive 
20% 44% 36% 
 55% 45% 
1997-2013 584% 800% 4.0% 6.0% 3.0% 2.9% 
Multiplicative 
39% 31% 30% 
 51% 49% 
Additive 
39% 29% 32% 
 48% 52% 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for other OECD countries. 
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 Multiplicative decomposition of private wealth growth, 1970-2010: international comparison 
 
Wealth-income ratio (b ) 
Income 
growth 
rate 
(g ) 
Decomposition of wealth growth rate Share of total wealth accumulation coming from 
1966 1970 2010 
Real growth 
rate of wealth 
(
w
g ) 
Savings-
induced 
wealth growth 
rate (
ws
g ) 
Capital gains-
induced 
wealth growth 
rate (q ) 
Initial 
wealth savings 
Capital 
gains 
South 
Korea 322% 474% 515% 7.2% 7.4% 
3.6% 3.6% 6% 47% 47% 50% 50% 
Japan - 299% 601% 2.5% 4.3% 3.4% 0.9% 18% 64% 18% 78% 22% 
USA 348% 342% 410% 2.8% 3.3% 3.0% 0.3% 28% 65% 7% 90% 10% 
UK 311% 306% 522% 2.2% 3.6% 1.9% 1.6% 25% 41% 34% 55% 45% 
France 287% 310% 575% 2.2% 3.8% 3.4% 0.4% 23% 70% 8% 90% 10% 
Germany 216% 225% 412% 2.0% 3.5% 4.3% -0.8% 25% 91% -16% 121% -21% 
Italy 222% 239% 676% 1.9% 4.6% 4.2% 0.4% 17% 76% 7% 92% 8% 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for other OECD countries. 
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 Multiplicative decomposition of national wealth growth, 1970-2010: international comparison 
 
Wealth-income ratio (b ) 
Income 
growth 
rate 
(g ) 
Decomposition of wealth growth rate Share of total wealth accumulation coming from 
1966 1970 2010 
Real growth 
rate of wealth 
(
w
g ) 
Savings-
induced 
wealth growth 
rate (
ws
g ) 
Capital gains-
induced 
wealth growth 
rate (q ) 
Initial 
wealth savings 
Capital 
gains 
South 
Korea 400% 594% 751% 7.2% 7.8% 
4.0% 3.7% 5% 49% 46% 52% 48% 
Japan - 359% 616% 2.5% 3.9% 3.1% 0.8% 21% 61% 17% 78% 22% 
USA 397% 404% 431% 2.8% 3.0% 2.1% 0.8% 31% 49% 20% 71% 29% 
UK 332% 365% 527% 2.2% 3.1% 1.3% 1.8% 29% 30% 41% 42% 58% 
France 366% 351% 605% 2.2% 3.6% 2.7% 0.9% 24% 57% 19% 75% 25% 
Germany 304% 313% 416% 2.0% 2.7% 3.1% -0.4% 35% 75% -9% 114% -14% 
Italy 246% 259% 609% 1.9% 4.1% 2.6% 1.5% 20% 51% 29% 63% 37% 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for other OECD countries. 
Note: The numbers for UK in Table 4 of Piketty and Zucman (2014) are slightly different those in Table 5. We take the latter.
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 The private savings rates, 1966-2013: international comparison 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for 
other OECD countries.  
 
Notes: 
(1) The private saving rate = (total savings of private sector – capital depreciation 
of private sector) / national income. 
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 Capital-income ratio (b ) in South Korea, 1966-2013 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
 
Notes: 
(1) Private wealth = non-financial assets + net financial assets (including 
households/NPISHs only). 
(2) National wealth = non-financial assets + net financial assets (including 
households/NPISHs and government). 
(3) National wealth (B) = national wealth + net wealth of the corporate sector. 
(4) Dotted lines: the capital-income ratios when public pensions are taken out from 
the net financial asset of government. 
 
* NPISH-Non-profit institutions serving households 
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 Composition of national wealth in South Korea, 1966-2013 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
Notes: 
(1) National wealth = non-financial assets + net financial assets (including 
households/NPISHs and government). 
(2) Other domestic non-financial capital includes non-residential buildings and 
underlying land, facilities assets, intellectual property products, and inventories; 
Social overhead capital includes structures and underlying land, recreational 
land, and other land; Housing includes dwellings and underlying land; 
Agricultural land includes agricultural land and forest land. (See Table A.1 in 
Appendix for asset classification.) 
 
* NPISH-Non-profit institutions serving households 
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 Composition of each institutional sector’s capital-income ratio, 1966-2013 
Households and NPISHs Government Corporate sector 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
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 Capital-income ratio (b ), 1966-2013 (national wealth): 
international comparison 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for 
other OECD countries 
 
Notes:  
(1) National wealth = non-financial assets + net financial assets (including 
households/NPISHs and government). 
(2) The thin line (with no mark) for South Korea represents the capital-income ratio 
obtained when public pensions are taken out from the net financial asset of 
government. 
 
* NPISH-Non-profit institutions serving households 
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 Capital-income ratio (b ), 1966-2013 (private and government 
wealth): international comparison 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for 
other OECD countries 
Notes: 
(1) Private wealth = non-financial assets + net financial assets (including 
households/NPISHs only). 
(2) National wealth = non-financial assets + net financial assets (including 
households/NPISHs and government). 
(3) Government wealth = non-financial assets + net financial assets (including 
government). 
(4) The thin line (with no mark) for South Korea: the capital-income ratio when 
public pensions are taken out from the net financial asset of government.. 
200%
300%
400%
500%
600%
700%
800%
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
% 
of 
nat
ion
al i
nco
me
Private wealth
USA France Germany Italy Spain UK Japan S.Korea
-100%
0%
100%
200%
300%
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
% 
of 
nat
ion
al i
nco
me
Government wealth
USA France Germany Italy Spain UK Japan S.Korea
16 
 
 Capital income share (a) in South Korea, 1966-2013 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
 
Notes: 
(1) In estimating the capital income share, the Bank of Korea takes all of the self-
employed income as capital income, while we take only a part of it as capital 
income after dividing the self-employed income into labor and capital incomes 
according to the proportion that the compensation of the employee and the 
operating surplus take in the rest of the economy. Cho et al. (2014) also assume 
that the self-employed income can be divided into labor and capital income 
while maintaining that per capita wage of the self-employed is equal to half of 
the per capita income of laborers in other sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
The Bank of Korea Cho et al. Our method
17 
 
 Composition of factor income shares in South Korea, 1966-2013 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
 
Notes: 
(1) In splitting the income of the self-employed into labor and capital income, we 
assume the proportion of labor and capital income of the self-employed is the 
same as the proportion in the rest of the economy. 
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 Capital income share (a), UTIP-UNIDO Theil index, top decile 
income share, and Gini coefficient in South Korea, 1966-2013 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for capital income share, University of Texas 
Inequality Project Database for UTIP-UNIDO Theil index, Kim and Kim 
(2014) for top decile income share, and Sung (2014) for Gini coefficient.  
 
Note: We multiply 10 to the original UTIP-UNIDO Theil index. 
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 Capital income share (a), 1966-2013: international comparison 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for 
other OECD countries. 
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 The rate of return on capital versus the income growth rate in 
South Korea, 1966-2013 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
 
Notes: 
(1) The rate of return on capital is defined as capital income ratio divided by capital-
income ratio (r a b= ), thus is computed by capital income divided by wealth.  
(2) The income growth rate is Hodrick-Prescott filtered value, because we want to 
compare the rate of return on capital with long-run trend of the income growth 
rate. 
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 The rate of return on capital versus the income growth rate in other OECD Countries, 1966-2011 
 
 
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014) for the rate of return on capital and income growth rate (Hodrick-Prescott filtered). 
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 Capital income share (a) versus r/g in South Korea, 1966-2013 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
 
Notes: 
(1) The income growth rate (g) in the computation is Hodrick-Prescott filtered value. 
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 The rate of return on capital, 1966-2013: South Korea versus a selected OECD country 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for other OECD countries.
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 Capital income share, the rate of return on private capital, and 
private capital-income ratio in South Korea, 1966-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ computations using the KNBS (2014), Cho et al. (2014), and the 
KNIPA (each year). 
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 The correlation between the rate of return on capital and capital-income ratio in South Korea, 1966-2013 
National wealth Private wealth 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
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 The correlation between the capital income share and capital-income ratio in South Korea, 1966-2013 
National wealth Private wealth 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
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 Simulated capital-income ratios without capital gains in South 
Korea, 1966-2013 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
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 Simulated capital-income ratios without capital gains in South 
Korea, 1997-2013 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
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Appendix: Miscellaneous tables and figures 
  
30 
 
Table A1: Assets comprising national wealth in the Korean National Balance 
Sheet and in the current paper  
 
 
Non-
financial 
assets 
Produced non-
financial assets 
Fixed 
assets 
Construction 
assets 
Dwellings (Residential 
buildings) a) 
Other buildings (Non-
residential buildings) a) 
Structures (Other 
construction) a) 
Facilities assets Transport equipment a) 
Machinery (including 
weapon system) a) 
Cultivated biological 
resources b) 
Intellectual 
property 
products 
R & D expenditure a) 
Other intellectual property 
products a) 
Inventories (excluding those in the military) c) 
Valuables * 
Non-produced 
non-financial 
assets 
Natural 
resources 
Land b) -- Land underlying dwellings, Land 
underlying other buildings, Land underlying 
structures, Agricultural land, Forest land, 
Recreational land, Other land  
Subsoil assets (Mineral and energy reserves) * 
Forests (Standing timber assets) * 
Water resources * 
Contracts, leases and licenses * 
Goodwill and marketing assets * 
Financial assets/liabilities Monetary gold and SDRs 
Currency and deposits 
Debt securities, Loans 
Equity and investment fund shares 
Insurance, pension and standardized guarantee schemes 
Financial derivatives and employee stock options 
Other accounts receivable/payable 
 
* Starred items are not included in our definition of wealth, although the KNBS provides 
estimates for some of them (such as subsoil assets and forests). 
a) The KNBS uses the perpetual inventory method in the estimation.  
b) The KNBS uses the quantity-times-price method in the estimation.  
c) The KNBS uses the estimates at the industry level.  
 
Source: Bank of Korea (2014), p. 33 
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 Composition of national wealth: international comparison  
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 Capital-income ratio (b ) in other OECD countries, 1966-2011 
 
 
Source: The data appendix of Piketty and Zucman (2014).
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 Capital income share (a), 1966-2013: Korea versus a selected OECD country 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation for South Korea and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for other OECD countries. 
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 Capital income share (a), UTIP-UNIDO Theil index top, decile income share, and Gini coefficient in other 
OECD countries, 1966-2012 
 
 Source: Piketty and Zucman (2013) for capital income shares, University of Texas Inequality Project Database for UTIP-UNIDO 
Theil index, World Top Incomes Database for top decile income shares, and OECD statistics for Gini coefficients. 
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 Capital income share (a) versus r/g in other OECD countries, 1966-2011 
 
 
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014) 
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